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This paper contributes to the growing literature that attempts to explain
unemployment persistence. We show that when the economy is struck by a
negative transitory (or permanent) demand or supply shock, ﬁrms can ﬁnd
their way back quicker to the pre-shock (or new) employment levels if they are
risk-averse. The reason is that risk aversion in ﬁrms creates a self-adjusting
mechanism whereby cautious ﬁrms adjust hiring and wage-setting decisions
to try to regain the pre-shock employment levels and minimize ﬂuctuations
in proﬁts. Therefore, perhaps surprisingly, risk aversion in ﬁrms is seen as a
stabilizing macroeconomic force that reduces unemployment inertia.
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Keywords: Unemployment, Persistence, Risk Aversion.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Related Literature 3
3 The Basic Model 5
3.1 The Firm’s Optimization Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 The Macroeconomic Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 The Steady State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4 Dynamic Analysis 12
4.1 Saddlepath Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2 The Impact of Macroeconomic Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3 Hysteresis and Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4 Numerical Illustration and Quantiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Conclusion 231 Introduction
The question of why the unemployment rate takes a long time before it reverts
back to its natural rate following a negative exogenous supply or demand shock has
been the subject of unremitting interest in macroeconomics. An insight into this
question is crucial for understanding the rise in the unemployment rates in many of
the OECD countries in the last two decades and is equally crucial for the formulation
of public policy.
This paper contributes to the debate on the causes of unemployment persistence
by raising the interesting theoretical possibility that a lower degree of risk aversion
on the part of the ﬁrms can obstruct the speed at which employment reverts to
its steady-state levels which we also call its natural rate. From the perspective of
the intertemporal-equilibrium model of endogenous natural-rate theory of Hoon and
Phelps (1992) we show that in the aftermath of a random transitory (or permanent)
shock to either productivity or interest rates which drive the economy’s employment
level below its steady-state, risk aversion in ﬁrms tends to accelerate the speed of
adjustment back to the steady-state employment. The reason is that risk aversion
in ﬁrms serves as a self-adjusting device whereby cautious ﬁrms try to regain the
pre-shock employment levels in an attempt to stay close to the steady-state proﬁt
levels. Thus, ﬁrms in a such a world like to keep closer to their steady-state proﬁt
levels and strive to regain these levels once perturbed from them. However, this
close tracking of the ‘steady-state’ comes at a cost in the form of altering wages,
hiring or losing workers during the period in which adjustment takes place. In this
sense, risk aversion can be seen as to actually reduce sluggishness in the employment
series irrespective of the levels of labour market rigidities characterized in the form
of high training cost and low quit rates in our model.1
Our theory oﬀers a new prospective on the speed of unemployment adjustment.
A model that comes close to the ideas developed in this paper is Frank (1990) in that
in both papers ﬁrms are risk averse; but in contrast to Frank our model is dynamic
1Low quit rates and high training costs could both result from legislation in the labour markets.
1and focuses on adjustment speeds of unemployment (rather than the sustainability
of equilibrium recessions).
A crucial empirical question is to what extent can we treat ﬁrms as being risk
averse? And if so, what makes ﬁrms behave in this way? Some factors that can
explain the latter question are non-diversiﬁed owners, cash constraints and ﬁnancial
problems. Risk aversion in ﬁrms is also commonly found in labour market contract-
ing models such as Grossman and Hart (1981). Perhaps a better answer to the latter
question and also partly to the ﬁrst, lies in the literature on agency theory. In par-
ticular, theories on incentive of procurement and regulation suggest that the degree
of risk aversion amongst decision-makers in ﬁrms may actually be generated by the
incentive structure in that organization (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993, 1986, 2000). For
example, take a large modern ﬁrm in which there is a separation between ownership
and management and the managers maximize their lifetime incomes by pleasing the
owners who favour steady income growth. In such a set up managers are likely to
avoid risky situations and prefer steady income growth (Monsen and Downs, 1965).
One way to ensure that managers act like owners is to oﬀer bonuses in the form of
shares or regulate such that managers have to accumulate and then keep a certain
number of shares by a certain period. This is often the current practice.2 Hence,
the degree of risk aversion is endogenously determined by the structure and the
incentives provided by the owners of the organization.
The reason why we believe this is interesting in the context of the unemploy-
ment debate is that the choice of one institutional structure and incentive schemes
over another may emerge from the regulatory environment, political structures and
individual and social values within which the ﬁrm operates. We would expect such
features and hence the degree of risk aversion to diﬀer across countries (and also
across time). However, this is not the focus of this paper which is exclusively con-
cerned with the relationship between the speed of adjustment of unemployment and
risk aversion.
2See, for example, remuneration reports 2002 for Hilton Group plc, ICI plc, HBos plc and
Invensys plc.
2The answer to the ﬁrst question on the empirical relevance of risk aversion in
ﬁrms can be best found in surveys on the risk-taking behavior of entrepreneurs
where a large proportion of established-entrepreneurs who own their businesses de-
sire a moderate level of risk (Mancuso (1975) and Brockhaus (1980)). Interestingly,
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1984, 1990) study a randomly selected sample of top-
level executives were asked to play a hypothetical role within a business context and
make decisions under a variety of risky situations. It was found that executives
had the tendency of avoiding risk or delaying decisions until more information was
made available to them. Thus, it seems that risk aversion in ﬁrms may be more
commonplace than one might normally expect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy
present the related literature. In Section 3 we develop the basic structure of the
model and solve for the steady-state. In Section 4 we analyze, using both theory
and numerical simulations, the dynamic properties of the model with respect to the
ﬁrm risk aversion and the speed of adjustment of unemployment. Finally, in Section
4 we present the concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The existing literature oﬀers two strands of thinking which try to explain the be-
haviour of unemployment. One the one hand, ‘the persistence school’ take the
view that changes in unemployment are determined by past shocks, rather than
changes in the fundamentals determining the economy which in turn shift the natu-
ral rate.3 The emphasis here is on the dynamics of unemployment during the period
in which the economy ﬁnds itself away from the natural unemployment rates. Par-
ticular attention is paid to how the interplay between current and past nominal
and real shocks impact on the adjust of the unemployment towards its natural-rate.
For example, Henry, Karanassou and Snower (2000) and Karanassou and Snower
3See Turner et al., (2001) for a survey.
3(1998 a, b) show that a chain of past transitory but long-lasting shocks to labour
demand and supply and real wages delays the adjustment of unemployment to its
steady-state levels. The economy, therefore, takes a while before it works its way
through these networks of shocks.
According to an alternative strand of thinking Hoon and Phelps (1992), Phelps
(1994), Phelps and Zoega (1998) argue that the natural unemployment-rate has
a time path that is generated by the structure of the economy: its technological
factors, institutions, laws and individual and social preferences. This is commonly
referred to as the ‘structuralist school’. Here, real disturbances are met by changes
to the structure of the economy (labour tax laws, working hours, etc.) which then
permanently shift the natural unemployment rate. Thus, the movements from one
equilibrium natural-rate to another are considered as the prime source of increased
unemployment that we observe in OECD countries. Also the economy can be slow
to adjust to these new equilibrium natural rates. There are many reason why the
adjustment to the new equilibrium natural-rates can be slow. For example, in
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) hold responsible hiring and ﬁring
cost for creating inertia in unemployment rate. Indeed, with hiring and ﬁring costs
as sunk costs the expected proﬁtability per hiree has to be high enough to justify
hiring. However, until this perceived proﬁtability reaches the threshold that justiﬁes
hiring, unemployment rates may stagnate. The insider-outsider theory of Lindbeck
and Snower (1988) and Blanchard and Summers (1986) argue that in the aftermath
of a negative shock to unemployment, the remaining employees - the insiders -
bargain for higher wages with little regard to the unemployed - the outsiders. The
insiders have such bargaining power due to the presence of hiring and ﬁring costs.
The consequence of this process is that they are able to push their wages high at
the cost of creating employment and again delaying the recovery process. Another
plausible reason for inertia is the shortages in capital stock that may prevent ﬁrms
from hiring rapidly. Thus, the longer the ﬁrm takes to install new capital with
which new workers can work, the longer unemployment rates persist. Finally,
4Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and Layard and Nickell (1987) argue that during
prolonged durations of unemployment, unemployed workers gradually loose human
capital. Not only this makes them less attractive workers to hire but it also erodes
their sharpness during the job-search process. Such workers, therefore, take a long
while before they get back employment making the overall unemployment levels
slow to adjust. Amongst all these explanations, Bean (1994) argues that there is
reasonable evidence to suggest that the hiring and ﬁring costs and long durations
of unemployment arguments are more successful in explaining the slow adjustment
problem.
Against this background, this paper follows the structuralist school, and Hoon
and Phelps (1992, 1997) and Orzag and Zoega (1995, 1995) in particular, general-
izing the inﬂuential core model in this literature to the case where ﬁrms are risk
averse. Our results show that risk-aversion diminishes the role factors such as hiring
and ﬁring costs play in determining the delays in the speed of adjustment to the
natural unemployment-rate which occur following a demand or supply shock.
3 The Basic Model
Production is carried out by n identical competitive ﬁrms each with labour, E/n,
as the only factor of production and with constant returns to scale. n is exogenous.








where Y is the ﬁrm’s output, E is total employment and E/n is the stock of em-
ployees each ﬁrm has. The dynamics of total employment are




′ > 0, q
′′ ≥ 0 (2)
In (2), the change in employment is the diﬀerence between the total number of
trainees, H, and number of people who quit, qE. The variables Y, H and E are
measured in per capita terms such that we normalize the workforce L ≥ E at unity.
5This implies that E is the employment rate, while H is the number of trainees
per capita. As in Salop (1979) and Hoon and Phelps (1992) the quit rate, q, is a
concave function of the ratio of the expected average industry wage, ¯ w to the ﬁrm’s
own wage, w. When the wage prospects are better elsewhere the employees leave
the ﬁrm at the rate of 1
wq′( ), while when the employing-ﬁrm oﬀers wages that are
better than the industry average the employee quit rate drops by − ¯ w
w2q′( ).
At time τ, the representative ﬁrm employs the proportion E/n denoted by e,
out of the total workforce4 and maximizes the present discounted value of a concave




u(π(t))exp(−r(t − τ))dt (3)
where π = (Λ − w − T(h))e, T(0) = 0, T ′,T ′′ > 0.
Firms are risk averse5 and face a concave utility function in proﬁts such that
u′( ) > 0 and u′′( ) < 0. In the proﬁt function, π, the ﬁrst term is the output
produced by the ﬁrm where prices have been suppressed to unity. The second term
is the wage bill of the ﬁrm. The ﬁnal term T(h)e is the total cost of training H
new workers, where h = H/E is the ﬁrms’ hiring rate. The convex function T(h)
denotes the training cost per unit of labour and captures the output lost per worker
at the hire rate h. The discount factor exp(−r(t − τ)) is the rate at which output
can be substituted intertemporally. The rate of interest r is exogenously given.
4The proportion of workers employed by each ﬁrm is
E/L
n . However, given our normalization
L = 1 we arrive at E
n = e.
5Strictly speaking since our analysis is deterministic throughout there is no risk in our model and
‘risk aversion’ refers to a ﬁrms with a ﬁnite elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We examine
the speed of convergence of such ﬁrms and the macro-economy to a given steady state which can
change as a result of permanent shocks to underlying parameters. In a stochastic environment, of
course, we can refer to our ﬁrms as indeed being risk averse.
63.1 The Firm’s Optimization Problem
At time, τ, the ﬁrm maximizes V (τ) given by (3) with respect to {w(t),h(t)}, t ≥ τ









given e(0) and a terminal condition limt→∞[e−rte(t)] ≥ 0. Equation (4) shows how
employment evolves at ﬁrm level and is obtained by dividing both sides of equation
(2) by the number of ﬁrms n. Assume that n is constant.
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where λ is the shadow value of the trained worker. Then applying Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle, the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions are given by:
∂H
∂h
= 0 ⇒ T
′(h)u
′(π) = λ (6)
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∂w
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limt→∞[exp(−rt)λ(t)e(t)] = 0 (10)
In Equation (6) the right-hand-side is the value of a trained worker, while the left-
hand-side is the sacriﬁce the ﬁrm makes – in the form of the output loss that occurs
when trained workers spend time training the hirees instead of actively producing
and the marginal change in ﬁrm’s proﬁts evaluation that results from this investment
– in having to train a newly hired worker. Thus, the equation shows that the ﬁrm
will sacriﬁce resources on training until it brings the value of a marginal trainee
at parity with the value of the trained employee. Interestingly, the intuition just
spelled out is subtly diﬀerent in comparison with Hoon and Phelps (1992) and other
studies such as Orszag and Zoega (1996, 1995). Indeed, our model features the
7possibility that any variable that aﬀects ﬁrm’s current proﬁtability also aﬀects the
valuation (the utility) the ﬁrm assigns to a proﬁt level. This in turn aﬀects the ﬁrm’s
perception of the value of its stock of employees. Consequently, we can infer from
our ﬁrst-order-condition equation (6) that an extra worker is worth substantially
more at lower levels of proﬁts compared with higher proﬁt levels due to diminishing
marginal utility in proﬁts. This is in contrast to other studies that adopt the usual
assumption of risk-neutral ﬁrms with utility functions linear in proﬁts, since then
the worth of an extra unit of proﬁt is independent of the levels of proﬁts.
Equation (7) tells that at the optimum the marginal cost of raising wages by
a unit, in the form of the lower current proﬁts due to the direct wage increases
by the amount e and the fall in the marginal utility associated with these reduced
proﬁtability level, equals the marginal beneﬁt in the form of lower turnover costs
due the retaining of employees whose value is given by λ.
Using (6), equation (8) can be rewritten as
˙ λ = −u
′(π)[f






and shows that the shadow value of a worker evolves over time, ˙ λ, according to the
marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs that result from raising employment by one
unit. The marginal beneﬁts – the ﬁrst term – come in the form of the net marginal
product of a newly employed worker and the immediate change in the marginal
utility in proﬁts that is associated with this extra product. The net marginal
product is composed of the marginal product from extra employment, f′(e), the loss
in the output caused by our employee having to train trainees instead of actively
producing, T(h), and the savings in the marginal costs of training made possible
by our new employee sharing the burden of training the trainees, hT ′(h). The
marginal costs, the second set of terms of the right-hand side, are composed of the
direct wage cost of employing a worker and the marginal loss in the utility of proﬁts
that this extra cost brings, u′(π)w, the quit rate evaluated at the worker’s shadow
value, λq( ¯ w
w), and the opportunity cost of investing on the employee, rλ, evaluated
at the shadow-value of the worker.
83.2 The Macroeconomic Equilibrium
To complete our macro-model of employment, hiring rate and wages we recall that
our normalization of the workforce at unity implies that E and 1 − E are the em-
ployment and unemployment rates respectively. Then having set out the individual
ﬁrm’s optimization problem we can endogenize the expected average industry wage
as ¯ w = ¯ w× probability of employment = wE, following Calvo (1979), Salop(1979)
and Hoon and Phelps (1992). This equilibrium relationship implies that the wage
of the representative ﬁrm, w, is larger than the expected industry wage if there is
unemployment (i.e., if E < 1).
The analysis of the dynamic system (6) to (9) will be carried out in terms of
state variables e = E
n and λ. Upon substituting ¯ w = Ew and dividing (6) by (7)
we obtain wages as function of employment and the hiring rate
w = Eq
′(E)T
′(h) = ω(E,h) (11)












′(h) = λ (12)
Hence solving (12) implicitly for h and substituting back into (11) we arrive at w
and h expressed in terms of E and λ:
h = h(E,λ) (13)
w = ω(E,h(E,λ)) ≡ w(E,λ) (14)
say. Using (14), (13) and (6), the dynamic system (8) and (9) in (E,λ) space can
now be written as
˙ E = [h(E,λ) − q(E)]E ≡ F(E,λ) (15)
˙ λ =
 










say, plus the transversality condition, (10). One state variable, E, is predetermined
at time t with initial condition E(0) given exogenously. The second state variable,
9λ, is non-predetermined or ‘free’ and satisﬁes the terminal condition (10) with e(t) =
E(t)
n .
We follow Hoon and Phelps (1992), section III, in interpreting this macro-model
with a exogenous constant interest rate as that of a small open economy facing an
exogenous world interest rate. Current account dynamics are excluded by conduct-
ing our stability analysis in the vicinity of a steady state in which trade is balanced
and net foreign assets are zero.6
3.3 The Steady State
In the steady state with ˙ E = ˙ λ = 0 we have









(Λ − w − T(h)) (19)
giving us three equations for h, w and E. Then λ is given by (6).
We ﬁrst examine the wage-employment relationship given by (18). At the steady-
state the wages depend on the investment made on the marginal worker– in the
form of training costs – and their marginal quit propensity. Diﬀerentiating (18)







′′(E) > 0 (20)
since T ′, T ′′, q′(E), q′′(E) ≥ 0. The ﬁrst term is the rise in turnover as employment
rises, q′ + Eq′′, and each quitting worker must be replaced at cost, T ′. The second
term is the rise in training costs associated with higher employment. Thus, higher
wages and higher (lower) employment (unemployment) go hand in hand and this
relationship is concave (convex) from the origin. This ensures that our model is
6Without these simplifying assumptions involving a constant real interest rate and a lineariza-
tion in the vicinity of a balanced trade steady state, we would be faced with a third-order, analyt-
ically intractable dynamic system.
10consistent with the Phillip’s curve wage-employment (or wage-unemployment) rela-
tionship. To summarise:
Proposition 1.
In the steady state, the wage is an increasing function of the employment
rate.
The steady-state is at the intersection of the ˙ E = 0 curve, (17), and the ˙ λ = 0
curve. The former is upward-sloping in (h, E) space since q′ > 0. To show that the





T ′ + rT ′′ < 0 (21)
assuming the conditions for proposition 1 hold (in which case w′(E) > 0), and
recalling that T ′,T ′′ > 0. The derivative implies that, higher levels of steady-state
employment are associated with lower levels of hiring rate. Finally we observe that
the steady state given by (17) to (19) is independent of the functional form u( ).
We summarize these results as:
Proposition 2.
There exists a unique steady state that is independent of the degree of
risk aversion of the ﬁrm.
Figure 1 shows the ‘E stationary’ curve ( ˙ E = 0) and the ‘λ- stationary’ curve
(˙ λ = 0) in (h, E) space for functional forms and parameter values discussed in section
3.1. Notice that the equilibrium unemployment rate stands as 5%. In the dynamic
analysis that follows, we consider permanent shocks to underlying parameters that
change the steady state. We then examine the subsequent dynamic transition from
the old to the new steady state. These are discussed in section 3.2.























Figure 1: The Steady State in h-E Space
4 Dynamic Analysis
4.1 Saddlepath Stability
To analyze the local stability of the dynamic system (15) and (16) in the vicinity of







where partial derivatives FE ≡ ∂F
∂E, etc are evaluated at the steady state. The
eigenvalues µ = µ1 and µ = µ2 are given by the solutions to
µ
2 − (FE + Gλ)µ + Θ = 0 (23)
where Θ ≡ FEGλ−FλGE. Since we have one predetermined and one non-predetermined
variable, saddlepath stability requires that one root has real part positive and the
other has real part negative.
12Partially diﬀerentiating F(E,λ) and G(E,λ) deﬁned in (15) and (16) at the
steady state and using (17) and (19), we have
FE = E(hE − q
′) (24)




















where q = q(E), T = T(h), f = f(E) and we omit the arguments in q′, T ′, T ′′ and
f′′. It follows that





′′r) + wλ(hE − q
′) − hλwE] (28)










These partial derivatives imply that, other things being equal, the higher the shadow-
value of a worker or the employment rate, the higher wages that has to be paid to the
employees at the equilibrium. Such a policy will help deter workers from quitting


























n ET ′(Eq′T ′′ + T ′)
(33)
hE = −
u′′(π)(T ′)2(r − E(Eq′′ + q′))
u′(π)T ′′ −
u′′(π)
n ET ′(Eq′T ′′ + T ′)
(34)
7These derivations use (11) and (12).
13We can now use these results to examine the saddlepath stability of the dynamic
system. From (23) the eigenvalues are given by
µ =
FE + Gλ ±
 
(FE + Gλ)2 − 4Θ
2
(35)
Hence one root (µ = µ1) is real and negative and one root (µ = µ2) is real and
positive if Θ < 0. From (34) hλ > 0, and hence from (32), since λ > 0, we have
that Θ < 0 iﬀ [−q′(2T ′ + rT ′′ + Eq′T ′′) − Eq′′T ′] < 0. Since we have made the
usual convexity assumption that q′,q′′,T ′,T ′′ > 0, all the terms in this expression
are negative and hence we have shown that
Proposition 3.
The dynamic system is saddlepath stable.
4.2 The Impact of Macroeconomic Shocks
In the section we study the impact of aggregate demand and supply shocks. First,
we analyse a shock to aggregate demand arising from an exogenous fall in the world
real interest rate engineered by central banks outside the control of our economy.
Second, we study shocks to aggregate supply arising from exogenous productivity
shocks. As in ﬁgure 1 we remain in (h,E) space (although the dynamic analysis is
in (λ,E) space).
Recall that the interest rate appears in (19) and it represents the opportunity
cost of investing on an employee. Assuming that we are initially at the steady-
state (point A in Figure 2), a fall in the real interest rate implies that ˙ λ curve
shifts to the right from (16) and also tilts upwards from (21). The ﬁrms now ﬁnd
themselves in a position where the stream of marginal cash ﬂow attributable to an
extra employee is too high relative to her marginal opportunity costs of employment.
This implies that shadow value of a worker must have jumped with a corresponding
rise in investment on new workers. The ﬁrm therefore increases hiring causing the
training cost and wage cost (from (20)) to climb until marginal proﬁt contribution









Figure 2: Macroeconomic Shocks
employing her. This story can be seen from the arrows of motion in ﬁgure 2. At
ﬁrst the hiring rate jumps to point B since the shadow value of the workers jumps.
As more people are employed the rise in training costs and wage bills increase, this
reduces the shadow-value of a worker eventually bringing the growth in employment
to a halt (travelling from B to C). The natural employment rate permanently rises
to point C.
The second shock we study is a permanent positive shock to productivity. We
analyze this shock and follow Hoon and Phelps (1992) by interpreting the training
costs as some fraction, τ, of a trained worker’s productivity Λ. Thus, T(h) = τ(h)Λ,
where the fraction of productivity that is consumed by training new workers is
determined by the level of hiring. In the dynamic system the curve ˙ E = 0 is not







Now from the equations above a rise in productivity has a very similar aﬀect as
the permanent fall fall in the real interest in that the ˙ λ = 0 curve shifts and tilts
to the right. However, this time the marginal proﬁt contribution of an employee
instantaneously increases and as a result λ jumps up with a corresponding rise in
15investment in new workers and the hiring rate h . As the hiring process continues,
training costs and wage bill rise and this serves to pull back the marginal cash
ﬂow contribution of the marginal worker to the same level as the opportunity cost
of employing her. Thus, the value of h gradually declines and the steady-state
employment permanently achieves higher levels.
It is clear from the both shocks that risk-aversion does not play any role in
determining the level of the steady state. However, in the next section we show
that when the economy is in the state of transition from one steady-state to another,
i.e., follow the the arrows of motion in ﬁgure 2, risk-aversion plays a leading role for
either type of shocks.
4.3 Hysteresis and Risk Aversion
Up to this point we have shown that the ﬁrm’s risk aversion neither aﬀects the steady
state nor the possibility of instability (or indeterminacy8). However the degree of
risk aversion does aﬀect the size of the eigenvalues and hence the rate at which
the system reverts to the steady state following an exogenous shock. From standard
analysis of linear systems with non-predetermined variables (see, for example, Currie















λ − ¯ λ = −M
−1
22 M21(E − ¯ E) (37)
˙ E = [FE − FλM
−1
22 M21](E − ¯ E) (38)

















8Indeterminacy and multiple equilibria occurs in our model if both eigenvalues have negative
real parts. Both instability and indeterminacy are ruled out by proposition 3.
16where µ1 and µ2 are the real negative and positive eigenvalues found in the previous











˙ E = [FE + Gλ − µ2]E = µ1(E − ¯ E) (41)
using trace(J) ≡ FE + Gλ = µ1 + µ2.
We have now established that the rate at which employment returns to the steady
steady following either a temporary shock to employment itself (in which case the
economy reverts to the same steady state) or to a permanent change in the natural
rate of employment (then reversion is to a new steady state) is given by the absolute
size of the negative eigenvalue µ1:
µ1 =
FE + Gλ −
 
(FE + Gλ)2 − 4Θ
2
(42)
Provided that the dynamic system is saddlepath stable, which we have shown to be
the case, the dynamics of employment is given by
E(t) = E(0)e
µ1t (43)
To see how µ1 changes as risk aversion increases, consider a constant coeﬃcient




; ρ > 0, ρ  = 1
= log(π); ρ = 1 (44)
where ρ = −πu′′
u′ is the constant coeﬃcient of risk aversion.9 In the steady state,
using (19) we have that economy-wide proﬁts are nπ = rT ′E. Then in terms of ρ,
9Again, as noted previously, in our deterministic environment ρ is strictly the inverse of the
intertemporal rate of substitution. In a stochastic environment we can refer to risk aversion.
17from (32), (33) and (31) we have
FE(ρ) =
 
ρT ′(r − E(Eq′′ + q′))





rT ′  
2 + T′′
T′ (r + Eq′)
 
ρ(Eq′T ′′ + T ′) + rT ′′ (46)
Θ(ρ) =
rE [−q′(2T ′ + rT ′′ + Eq′T ′′) − Eq′′T ′]
ρ(Eq′T ′′ + T ′) + rT ′′ (47)
We are interested in the sign of
dµ1
dρ . If it is positive, them increasing risk aversion
pushes µ1 towards zero and towards pure hysteresis. If the derivative is negative,
it has the opposite eﬀect and risk aversion actually improves the stability of the
































rE [q′(2T ′ + rT ′′ + Eq′T ′′) + Eq′′T ′]
(ρ(Eq′T ′′ + T ′) + rT ′′)2 > 0 (49)
and so the last term in (48) is positive. Since FE + Gλ <
 
(FE + Gλ)2 − 4Θ the




dρ . Consider ﬁrst derivatives in the vicinity of


















which is negative. It follows that in the vicinity of ρ = 0, the eﬀect of increasing risk
aversion on the degree of stability of the macro-economy is ambiguous. However we
can establish an unambiguous result for higher values of ρ, the case where r << ρ¯ q,
¯ q being the quit rate in the steady-state. Then from the calibration that follows
we can establish that Θ
(FE+Gλ)2 << 1 and −FE >> Gλ. Then expanding (42) as a
binomial series we have
µ1 =



































Figure 3: Feedback Rules as ρ changes
From (45) for r << ρ¯ q, ¯ q, r << E(Eq′′ + q′) and it follows that
dFE
dρ < 0. Hence we
have established the proposition:
Proposition 4
For r << ρ¯ q, an increase in risk aversion increases the degree of stability
of the economy.
The intuition for this result can best be seen by examining the decision variables
of the ﬁrm, trajectories for the wage rate and the hiring rate, {w(t),h(t)} in terms of
a policy feed-back rule that responds to the current state of employment in the ﬁrm
and the value of the trained worker. In terms of aggregate employment (assuming
all ﬁrms are identical), in the vicinity of the steady state [ ¯ w,¯ h] the policy rule of
the representative ﬁrm is is given by
 
w(t) − ¯ w







E(t) − ¯ E
λ(t) − ¯ λ
 
(52)
Now consider the ﬁrm is adjusting to the steady state along a trajectory where
e(t) > ¯ e. For r << ρ¯ q we have seen that µ1 ≈ FE and hence from (37) λ(t) ≈ ¯ λ.
19Then the policy rule takes the approximate form
 
w − ¯ w







(e(t) − ¯ e) =
 
[(Eq′′ + q′)T ′ + Eq′T ′′hE]
hE
 
(E(t) − ¯ E) (53)
substituting for wE from (30). Now compare a ﬁrm with relatively low and high
degrees of risk aversion. In the former case hE is small so the ﬁrm responds to
being above the equilibrium employment level by raising the wage, but only changes
the hiring rate slightly. In the more risk averse case, for r < E(Eq′′ + q′) (easily
satisﬁed in our calibration), hE < 0 and grows in absolute size as ρ increases,
so the wage is raised by less than in the less risk averse case, quits are therefore
higher, and now the ﬁrm responds by lowering the hiring rate. As a result of these
diﬀerences employment returns faster to its steady state for the risk averse ﬁrm.
Clearly adjustment for e(t) < ¯ e is symmetrical: now the more risk averse ﬁrm hires
more and engineers less quits than the less risk averse risk neutral ﬁrm. In short,
ﬁrms are self-stabilizing in the face of shocks, and the more risk averse ﬁrm will
stabilize employment by more than the less risk averse ﬁrm. Figure 3 plots the
exact feedback coeﬃcients wE − M
−1
22 M21wλ of the wage on employment (the ‘w-
feedback’) and the corresponding ‘h-feedback’ hE − M
−1
22 M21hλ computed without
the approximation used in the analysis, for parameter values discussed in next sub-
section. The same features revealed in the analysis carry over to the exact solution:
the positive w-feedback on employment falls and the negative h-feedback rises in
absolute value, increasing the self-stabilization of the ﬁrm as risk aversion increases.
4.4 Numerical Illustration and Quantiﬁcation
To illustrate these results and attempt to quantify their the degree to which risk
averse ﬁrms self-stabilize employment, we turn to numerical computations. We
examine values of the risk aversion parameter ρ ∈ [0,1]. We assume the following
functional forms:
q(E) = q0E






20This leaves parameters Λ, q0, β and t. The interest rate r is exogenous and we set its
value to a plausible average real interest rate. By choice of units we can normalize
Λ = 1 so that a fully employed labour force produces on unit of output. ¯ E is given by
1− ¯ U where ¯ U is the natural rate of unemployment for which econometric estimates
are available. To calibrate the remaining three parameters we use the steady state
relationships given by (17) to (19) and econometric estimates for the unemployment
rate, and data for the quit rate q.10 We need one more item of data to complete the
calibration. Data on training costs T(h)E is available, but leads to implausibly low
degrees of persistence.11 We therefore appeal to estimates of the latter to pin down
the ﬁnal parameter.













2β−2 > 0 (57)
Thus the ‘wage curve’, w(E), has the familiar convex shape.
Now suppose we use data on training costs (as a proportion of total output)
¯ T ¯ E = TC, say, and on quit rate ¯ q. Then we have that 1




¯ E¯ q2 (58)
Given t and exogenous r, from (19) and ¯ w = βt¯ q2 we can solve for β as
β =
1 − TC
E − t¯ qr
t¯ q2 (59)
Finally q0 is now calibrated as q0 =
¯ q
¯ Eβ, though in fact this parameter is not required
for the stability analysis. We have completed the calibration of parameters β and t.
10The annual quit rate in Japan in 1989 was 10.9, for US 19.4, France 10.8 and Spain 9.6 (all in
1991 - see OECD (1994)).
11The average training cost for 12 European countries as a share of total labour costs is 1.5%
and for UK 2.8% (OECD, 1999).


























Figure 4: Calibration of Training Costs (TC)
For the computations of µ1 we then use
T
′ = t¯ q ; T







β(β − 1)¯ q
¯ E2 (61)
Then substituting into (45), (46) and (46) we have
FE =
ρ¯ q(r − ¯ qβ2)
(ρ¯ q(β + 1) + r)
− β¯ q (62)
Gλ =
r[(2 + β)¯ q + r]
(ρ¯ q(β + 1) + r)
(63)
Θ = −
¯ qβr[(2 + β)¯ q + r]
(ρ¯ q(β + 1) + r)
= −¯ qβGλ (64)
From these expressions it is clear that if ρ¯ q >> r, then Θ
(FE+Gλ)2 << 1, justifying
the approximations made in the analysis of the previous section.
We can now compute µ1 using these functional forms and parameters. Figure
4 sets ρ = 0.5 and shows the employment response to a unit negative shock (i.e.,
E(0) − ¯ E = −1) about the steady state for empirical data ¯ q = 0.1, ¯ U = 0.05,
22TC = 0.02 and r = 0.025 and compares the response with those with higher values
of ¯ TC. Clearly using data that suggests TC = 0.02 leads to an implausibly quick
responses: the economy returns to equilibrium within a year! However, a 50%
recovery within 3 years ﬁts in with the stylized facts12 and from our graphs this
suggests the TC should be between 0.1 and 0.2. We choose TC = 0.15. Our data
suggest that much of this cost of training does not appear as measured investments
and counts as the ‘intangible investment’, highlighted for instance in Parente and
Prescott (2000). Since their estimate of total intangible investment could be as much
as 50% of GDP for the US, our ﬁgure of 15% for training does not seem excessive.
With these parameter values, increasing risk aversion then increases the absolute
size of the negative eigenvalue (ﬁgure 5) making the macro-economy more stable,
and decreases unemployment persistence following a negative shock to employment
(ﬁgure 6). The policy rules for the risk-neutral and risk averse ﬁrms are contrasted
in ﬁgure 7. For the risk averse case wages are higher, quits are therefore lower
and more hiring takes place conﬁrming the increased self-stabilization of the ﬁrm
following a negative employment shock. Another way of quantifying the degree of
hysteresis is to evaluate the asymptotic variance of employment subject to a white
noise shock of variance σ2. This is given by σ2
−µ1. Then the eﬀect of increasing ρ
from 0 to 1 is to decrease the variance of employment by a factor
µ1(0)
µ1(1) which turns
out to be about 2
3 in our example.
5 Conclusion
The question we have examined is what explains the delays in the speed of adjust-
ment of unemployment rate towards its steady-state levels. We have shown that risk
aversion behaviour in ﬁrms tends to speed up the adjustment process towards the
steady-sate employment levels as the ﬁrms attempt to minimise ﬂuctuations in prof-
its. One clear policy implication stands out: if ﬁrms are risk averse there is less need
12See, for example, Alogoskouﬁs and Manning (1988) and Henry et al (2000)
23for macroeconomic policy stabilization through monetary and ﬁscal policy. Our cal-
ibrated model suggests however that allowing the coeﬃcient of risk aversion increase
from ρ = 0 to ρ = 1 removes around one-third of employment variation, therefore
still leaving a substantial role for government. The topic of how the institutional
structure of the economy and the degree of risk aversion in ﬁrms are related, and
how these may diﬀer across countries to cause diﬀerent adjustment speeds, awaits
further work.
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Figure 5: The Negative Eigenvalue as ρ changes

























Figure 6: Employment Trajectories as ρ changes

























Figure 7: Hiring and Wage Trajectories as ρ changes
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